**Data Privacy Impact Assessment**

askmyGP System

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# Introduction

The General Data Protection Regulation requires that a Data Privacy Impact Assessment is carried out on systems which contain confidential data in higher risk categories. This document fulfils that requirement.

# Purpose

This document represents the Data Privacy Impact Assessment for Version 3 of the Salvie product.

# 3 Scope

This policy applies to the Salvie system.

# 4 Applicability

This policy is relevant for IT staff of Salvie Ltd, the Salvie Ltd partners and customers of Salvie Ltd.

# The need for a DPIA

The askmyGP system facilitates a patient’s electronic communication with their GP Practice. The patient can enter a query or specify their clinical symptoms which are then routed to Practice staff to action accordingly. The patient’s name, gender, date of birth and symptomatology are captured, stored and retrieved by healthcare professionals. In addition, the patient may enter into an asynchronous dialog with a clinician or administrator and disclose further health information. This data is also stored in the application database.

Accidental or deliberate disclosure of the data to parties beyond the GP Practice and clinicians involved in the patient’s care could contravene the individual’s right to privacy.

The General Data Protection Regulation requires that a DPIA is carried out in circumstances where processing is “likely to result in high risk”. Article 35(3) provides some examples when a processing operation could be considered high risk – this includes ‘special categories’ of data. Special categories include health data.

Whilst the askmyGP system does not process data on a large scale, on balance it was felt that a DPIA should be constructed for the service. The askmyGP system executes several processing operations, however these operations constitute a similar level of risk. As such, this DPIA covers all askmyGP processing operations.

# Processing of the data

**Purpose of processing**

Data is captured and processed for the purpose of facilitating patients gaining access to primary care services. The information is used by the patient’s Practice to establish the optimal means by which care can be provided. To inform this decision-making, the patient is required to disclose details of their query which might be administrative in nature (e.g. I need a repeat prescription) or clinical (e.g. I am suffering from backpain). In some circumstances, the patient may choose to disclose sensitive information such as the presence of a sexually transmitted disease.

Patients benefit from the service by being able to participate in a demand-led workflow, ultimately reducing the time required to see a GP or gain access to other care services. GP practices benefit by having a more predictable and manageable flow of patients. askmyGP is a commercial venture by Salvie Ltd however the company does not benefit directly from patient identifiable data (i.e. the data is not used for marketing products or services to individuals).

**Nature of processing**

Patients will typically gain access to the service from either a direct URL publicised by the Practice or from a link on the Practice website. The URL or link will contain sufficient information to uniquely identify the Practice.

Prior to entering any data, the user is presented with a privacy statement and terms of use explaining the purpose of the data and with whom it is shared. Explicit consent is required in order to gain access to the service. Data processing then takes place on the basis of this consent.

Data is captured into an electronic web-based form which the user accesses via one of the supported browsers. The user is required to identify themselves by their name, gender and date of birth. In the future, the data may be supplemented by the patient’s NHS number. The user may enter the details not for themselves but for someone for whom they are caring.

The data is only disclosed to the Practice with whom the patient is intending to access care services. Individual Practices are responsible for ensuring that only appropriate personnel are exposed to the clinical data as would typically be set out in their local information governance policy.

The technology employed uses simple web-services linked to a secure MySQL database. The practice-facing component is hosted in an HSCN environment and is therefore subject to the security features of that network. Hosting is provided by an established and experienced third party called Xicon Limited. All data is retained in the UK. Websocket connections are made via Pusher.com and end-to-end encrypted.

**Information retention and deletion**

The data will be stored in an identifiable form for a period of 2 years. in line with the NHS Records Management Code of Practice. Two years after the date of the first database transaction, a yearly scheduled cleanse of the database will be undertaken. An SQL script will be used to remove legacy data older than 2 years without breaking referential integrity.

After the 2 year retention period, anonymous usage data may be retained for statistical purposes.

On decommissioning of the system, Salvie Ltd will notify its hosting partners and trigger their irretrievable data destruction processes.

Should an individual patient request their personal data to be deleted, this process can be conducted by the practice staff using dedicated functionality. In addition, the company could undertake this task if required.

**Subject access request**

The Subject Access Request Procedure is set out at IG0042 Subject Access Request Procedure.

**Scope of data**

The following identifiable information is captured:

* First name and surname
* Date of birth
* Gender
* Ideas, concerns and expectations with regards to the patient’s query or symptomatology \*
* Time and date of the query
* Content of the messaging dialog with administrative or clinical practice staff \*
* Telephone number
* Email address
* NHS Number added by practice staff

Data items marked \* could be considered to represent ‘special categories’ of data as they directly relate to health information.

The number of requests submitted by patients to each practice varies significantly between practices. However, 100 requests per day might be typical.

The service is not intended to be used by children. Parents may raise requests with regards to their children, but these would be attributed with the parent’s identity. The first name, surname, date of birth and gender of the child is maintained.

**Sharing with third parties**

Only anonymous usage data may be used for service evaluation purposes or shared with third parties. This may include patient age in years and sex, but no personal identifiable data.

## The Legal Basis for Processing

As a data processor we process data as instructed by the data controllers who are our customers and it is their responsibility to ensure this processing has a secure legal basis. The legal basis for this processing that the data controllers have determined is that It is in the public interest and for medical care as without capturing patient identifiable data and the associated symptomatology, it would not be possible for the data controllers to utilise our services to deliver care safely.

The system functionality and data capture scope are subject to change control processes (see IG0030 Managing Change Which Involves Personal Data). Each item of new functionality is reviewed in the development environment. Any changes to the product are reviewed to determine whether there is a material impact on the Data Privacy Impact Assessment and the document is updated accordingly. Should new personal data fields be captured, they would only be accepted into the development process if it could be demonstrated that the data was within the scope of the Privacy Notice and was required for the safe and efficient delivery of the service.

# Risk assessment

## Scope

Patient identifiable data is held only on the database server and is accessible to the application server. Both components are hosted in the cloud by a reputable hosting provider. As such, this risk assessment does not include factors related to the personal computing assets of employees and contractors who do not have access to the server components. These assets are architecturally discrete and pose sufficiently low risk to not warrant further examination.

## Privacy and security hazard log

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Privacy/Security hazard | Controls | Likelihood of harm | Severity of harm | Overall risk |
| Intruder exploits operating system vulnerability on application server or database | Server is accessible only by VPN over SSH.  The Ubuntu server is set to patch automatically  Weekly checks undertaken to ensure all relevant server components are up to date.  Database and application server default passwords have been changed. All passwords are strong.  Only the required packages are installed on the server to ensure no extraneous services are running.  Fortinet firewalls at each endpoint. VLAN enabled per customer environment. VDOM enabled.  Xicon have intrusion detection system in place.  Database content is encrypted.  Websocket connections are end-to-end encrypted via Pusher.com  The application server and database have been included in the system penetration testing. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| A user who is not authorised to access the application or database server gains access | Access to the live servers is limited to only two individuals.  Access is controlled according to the Company’s User Account Authorisation Policy (IG0018) and logged in IG0036 Application Access Authorisation Log.  Access to the servers is revoked when staff leave the organisation as set out in User Account Authorisation Policy (IG0018).  The server does not have a GUI so it is not susceptible to phishing or instant messaging threats.  Database content is encrypted.  Access to the servers can only be gained by VPN over SSH.  Servers are protected by strong passwords  Accounts are specific to individual users.  Web server is protected behind NetScaler, only https access is available to NetScaler.  All access to the servers is recorded in the Apache log and Authentications logs including failed login attempts. | Possible | Significant | Medium  ALARP |
| Application or database server is subject to malware attack. | Server is protected by ClamAV Anti-Virus software. Daily anti-virus scans are undertaken.  Servers are based on Ubuntu which is unlikely to be subjected to malware attack.  Server is set to automatically patch in order to address any potential security flaws.  Weekly checks undertaken to ensure all relevant server components are up to date.  Server does not have a GUI so is less susceptible to attack. Users unable to navigate to suspicious website, etc.  Access to server and the services installed on the server are carefully controlled.  Fortinet firewalls at each endpoint. VLAN enabled per customer environment. VDOM enabled  Periodic vulnerability scans are undertaken by Xicon.  As the server is hosted remotely, users are unable to insert usb drives or other peripherals into the infrastructure.  Xicon has policies and procedures in place to minimise risk of malware attack. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Security threat introduced by client workstation connecting into the database or application servers. | Access to the servers is limited to just two members or staff using two workstations.  The connectivity framework employed means that the local workstation and server components remain architecturally discrete. File transfer is controlled and limited to ftp.  Client workstations have up to date antivirus software installed.  Client workstations are subject to IG and remote working policy. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Disclosure of confidential data due to theft of workstation or portable device. | By policy, patient identifiable data is not stored on local workstations or portable devices and to do so would be subject to disciplinary measures.  Use of remote working is subject to the company policy IG0007 Mobile Computing and Teleworking Policy and Guidelines.  All data in the database is encrypted. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Disclosure of confidential information due to location of workstation (e.g. local on-lookers). | Patient identifiable data is encrypted in the database and cannot be viewed in human-readable form by staff.  Remote working is subject to IG0007 Mobile Computing and Teleworking Policy and Guidelines. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Disclosure of personal data due to vulnerabilities in the hosting organisation or data centre, (e.g. physical access). | Xicon is a reputable provider of hosting services. Whilst the precise security and policy procedures have not been made available for inspection by GP access, Xicon is compliant with ISO 27001:2013 and, consequently, it is assumed that appropriate measure are in place.  Xicon are also compliant with:  ISO 14001:2004 Environmental Management System Standard  OHSAS 18001: 2007 Occupational Health & Safety Management System Standard  ISO 50001:2011 Energy Management System Standard  PCI-DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard  BS5979 and BS8418 | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Data loss due to loss of application database. | The hosting infrastructure includes a second datacenter to which the application can fail over.  Database is subject to regular back ups as set out in IG0039 Back Up and Restore Policy.  The Company has a Business Continuity Plan (IG0027 Business Continuity Plan.)  The database is managed by a reputable hosting provider and supported by professional personnel.  The MySQL database employed is industry standard and staff are familiar with its configuration and operation.  Loss of historical data would not significantly compromise care delivery as the details of consultations are recorded in separate local clinical systems.  Servers are monitored using Xicon’s N-Able monitoring system from Solarwinds. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Disclosure due to improper handling of backups containing patient identifying details. | Backup is subject to a backup and restore policy. Backup files are maintained by the hosting provider and are not kept outside of this environment.  All identifiable data is encrypted in the database.  It is assumed that the hosting provider as appropriate measures in place to handle backup data according to ISO 27001. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Disclosure due to use of stored passwords. | Use of passwords is subject to company security policy. Passwords should not be written down or stored in any other form. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Confidential data is transported outside the UK | Xicon data centres are located entirely in the UK. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Patient-facing application subject to malicious attack (e.g. code injection) | The application has been developed using modern coding techniques to minimise code and sql injection.  The front-end application has been subject to penetration testing by an independent expert organisation. Identified vulnerabilities have been managed accordingly. | Possible | Significant | Medium  ALARP |
| User gains access to a different user’s account via the patient-facing application | Account access is governed by username and password entry. Passwords are validated by the zxcvbn password strength estimator. Through pattern matching and conservative estimation, the algorithm recognises and weighs 30,000 common passwords, common names and surnames according to US census data, popular English words from Wikipedia and US television and movies, and other common patterns like dates, repeats (aaa), sequences (abcd), keyboard patterns (qwertyuiop), and l33t speak.  The details of the username and password are not cached locally.  Passwords are masked on data entry by default.  Malicious users would typically only be able to access the details for one patient (i.e. for the user they logged in as) but would not be able to see the confidential information of anyone else.  Password reset emails are only valid for 24 hours.  Account login is throttled, so that brute force logins are not possible. | Possible | Significant | Medium  ALARP |
| User of patient-facing application sees confidential data for another patient | All patient data in the database is linked to a unique user ID which can only be accessed by the logged in user.  The system has been tested to ensure that it is only possible to view data for the currently logged in user.  Penetration testing has validated that this scenario cannot occur. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Unauthorised user gains access to the practice-facing application | The practice-facing application is hosted on the HSCN Virtual Private Network which is only accessible to healthcare organisations.  Access to the practice-facing application is controlled by user-specific usernames and passwords.  The system ensures that only strong passwords can be set by users.  The system requires that the password for the initial administrator account is changed on first use.  The username is the email so duplicates are not possible.  Passwords are obscured during creation by default. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Staff at one practice is exposed to patient data at another practice | All patient requests and other patient data is logically linked to the practice with whom the patient is communicating. Users of the practice system are unable to retrieve any data not relating to their practice.  Users are logically linked only to their own practice and therefore cannot access data for other practices.  The system has been tested to ensure that only information relating to the relevant practice user is accessible. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |
| Data shared with a third-party accidentally contains identifiable data | Data to be shared with third-parties is anonymous usage data only.  Identifying datasets are not shared with third-parties. These remain encrypted in the application database. | Remote | Significant | Low  ALARP |

## Risk matrix

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Severity | | |
| Minimal | Significant | Severe |
| Likelihood | Probable | Medium | High | High |
| Possible | Low | Medium | High |
| Remote | Low | Low | Medium |

## Measures to reduce risk further

Pen testing is regularly conducted, and the system is constantly monitored.

## Risk assessment summary

The risk assessment above has demonstrated that the privacy and security risks identified have been mitigated to As Low As Reasonably Practicable and are therefore considered to be Tolerable. However, work will continue to monitor these hazards and the associated risk in live service and as changes are made to the system.

# 6 Policy Review

Salvie Ltd Management will audit the policy periodically.

# 7 Policy Non-compliance

Employees and contractors violating this policy will be required to meet with their manager and may face disciplinary measures or termination of contract.

# 8 Policy Exceptions

Exceptions must be approved by the Salvie Ltd IG Forum.

# 9 Related Policies, Procedures and Guidelines

As referenced in above material.

# 11 Management Approval

On behalf of Salvie Ltd.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Approved By:** | | | |
| ***Name:*** | ***Role*** | ***Signature*** | ***Date:*** |
| Harry Longman | Chief Executive |  | November 12, 2020 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Date for next Review:** | November 12, 2021 |